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FOREWORD 
DAVID OLSON* 
It is a particular pleasure to introduce readers to this special patent-
themed issue of the Boston College Law Review. In response to the number of 
excellent and publishable articles on patent law they received this last cycle, 
the Law Review editors decided to dedicate an entire issue to this timely and 
important subject. It is not surprising that a great deal of important work is 
being done in patent law research: patent law, patent enforcement strategies, 
and attendant industries all continue to rapidly and significantly change. De-
spite this change, conflicts continue to beset the confluence of innovation and 
patent law. This is therefore a particularly tumultuous time for patent law and 
policy. 
The Americans Invents Act (“AIA”), which took full effect in 2013, was 
the most significant revision to patent statutory law in the past sixty years.1 
Among its innovations, the AIA ushered in a (mostly) first-to-file system of 
granting patents.2 Further, it changed the categories of prior art that can be 
used to invalidate patent applications;3 changed certain rules for patent eligi-
bility, such as eliminating the penalty of patent invalidity for those who fail to 
disclose the best mode of practicing their patented inventions;4 and changed 
the methods for reviewing patent validity after a patent has been granted.5 It 
also shifted more administrative responsibility to the Patent and Trademark 
Office.6 
In addition, the courts have been actively deciding patent law cases. 
Both the Federal Circuit, the sole court of appeals for patent cases, and the 
Supreme Court have been deciding significant patent law issues with consid-
erable frequency. There were many years in past decades in which the Su-
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 1 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 2 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 3 Id. Whether this change is one of form or of substance is a subject of debate. Compare Dan-
iel Taskalos, Metallizing Engineering’s Forfeiture Doctrine After the America Invents Act, 16 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 657, 695–96 (2013), with Nathan G. Ingham, Note, Anticipating New Refer-
ences: Predicting the Contours of the New “Otherwise Available to the Public” Category of Prior 
Art, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1533 (2012). 
 4 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 15(a), 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A). 
 5 Id., § 18, 35 U.S.C. § 311–329. 
 6 Id., § 10, 35 U.S.C. § 41. 
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preme Court did not take any patent law cases at all.7 Last term, it decided 
seven.8 Despite this active judicial attention (or, perhaps, because of it), pa-
tent law is plagued with a great deal of uncertainty.9 
The modern economy’s ever-increasing valuation of intellectual proper-
ty is the primary catalyst for this increasing attention to patent law.10 In addi-
tion, the latest, highly publicized patent “war” amongst smartphone manufac-
turers has publicly highlighted how important patents are to the fierce compe-
tition governing this highly innovative area.11  
Another reason for patent law’s increased relevance are the changes in 
what Oskar Liivak calls the “patent ecosystem.”12 In the last couple of dec-
ades, patent holders have sought profits from their patent portfolios in signifi-
cantly unprecedented ways. In contrast, before this trend, conventional wis-
dom taught that innovative market participants filed numerous patents to both 
protect their core innovations and to build defensive patent portfolios for use 
against competitors. 13 Thus, two big companies with overlapping patents 
would only in rare cases assert their patents, for fear of retaliation.14 As a re-
sult, patent quality, coverage, definiteness, along with the injunctions or dam-
ages that accompany patent verdicts, were less important doctrines.15 
Then came the patent “trolls.” Much like a fairytale troll who lives under 
a bridge and jumps out to demand payment for passage, a patent “troll” is an 
entity that buys up patents rather than innovate itself and then sues successful 
companies that arguably (and often unknowingly) infringe one or more of the 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of 
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 275–77 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s interest in patent 
law at the time as indicating a “continued retreat from patent law”). Importantly, last year’s term is 
not atypical of the Supreme Court’s interest in patent law in recent years. Each of the last several 
years, the Court has decided multiple patent cases. 
 8 AIPLA, Seven IP Cases Slated on Supreme Court Oral Argument Calendar, IPWATCHDOG, 
Feb. 25, 2014, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/02/25/seven-ip-cases-slated-on-supreme-court-oral-
argument-calendar/id=48214/, archived at http://perma.cc/7RHB-988H. 
 9 David S. Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards: Competing Notions of Incon-
sistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 ALA. L. REV. 647, 679 (2013) (“[O]ver the last six years, 
the Supreme Court has reversed each of the Federal Circuit's rules and replaced them with more 
contextual standards intended to decrease manifest error but at the price of some decreased pre-
dictability.”). 
 10 Irene Kosturakis, Intellectual Property 101, 46 TEX. J. BUS. L. 37, 40 (2014). 
 11 Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars: Triangulating 
the End Game, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 4–8 (2014). 
 12 Oscar Liivak, When Nominal Is Reasonable: Damages for the Unpracticed Patent, 56 B.C. 
L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2015).  
 13 David S. Olson, On NPEs, Holdups, and Underlying Faults in the Patent System, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. ONLINE 140, 141 (2014), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2014/04/99CLRO140-
March1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PN2F-RUR6. 
 14 Id. at 140–41. 
 15 Id.; see Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex Patent 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 333–34 (2010). 
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patents in the “troll’s” portfolio.16 The fairness of the patent “troll” label, and 
the question of who exactly qualifies as a patent troll, are the subjects of con-
siderable debate.17 Commentators likewise debate how much harm or benefit 
“trolls” actually cause.18 There is no arguing, however, that the past fifteen to 
twenty years have seen a considerable increase both in the quantity and liti-
giousness of firms that assert patents without themselves manufacturing in-
ventions.19 And because non-practicing trolls cannot be deterred by the threat 
of countersuit, questions of patent scope, definiteness, obviousness, subject 
matter, and damages have become much more important.  
This new generation of patent holders has also pioneered new approach-
es to monetizing patents, such as threatening end users with patent liability 
unless they pay a license fee.20 This novel approach to patent litigation has 
resulted in a vast increase in the number of patent lawsuits, as well as juris-
dictional anomalies like the explosion of litigation in the Eastern District of 
Texas, commonly regarded as friendly to patent plaintiffs.21 As a result of 
these controversial tactics and strategies, patent law has caught the rare atten-
tion of mainstream media, Congress, the courts, and the Executive. 
Because the AIA failed to settle many of these contentious issues, it also 
failed to decrease interest in patent law. The AIA’s failure is twofold. First, by 
the time it was passed, the AIA had been stripped of many of its more ambi-
tious and controversial patent reform proposals. Second, the AIA’s broad lan-
guage invites debate concerning its interpretation and application. Indeed, 
commentators argued about the AIA’s interpretation as soon as it was signed, 
resulting in proposals that it either be adjusted or replaced with more substan-
tial reform. Even now Congress is considering more patent reform legisla-
                                                                                                                           
 16 Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 
YALE L.J. 1590, 1650 (2011) (defining a patent troll as “a nonpracticing entity that has contributed 
little technology but hopes to use patenting as a source of profit”). 
 17 Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the “Patent Troll” Rhetoric, 
47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 437 & n.1 (2014). 
 18 See Olson, supra note 13, at 141–43. 
 19 Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 
392–93 (2014). 
 20 Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1469–
70 (2014). 
 21 Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 PENN L. REV. 631, 631 (2015). 
One of the changes put into effect by the AIA is designed to limit the kind of forum shopping that 
resulted in so many cases being filed in places like the Eastern District of Texas. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 299 (2012). See generally Dongbiao Shen, Misjoinder or Mishap? The Consequences of the AIA 
Joinder Provision, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 545 (2014) (explaining the provisions of the AIA 
directed to limiting forum shopping and examining their results). 
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tion.22 The Obama Administration has also made executive-level patent re-
form a priority.23 
Along with business interests and lobbyists, legal academics have joined 
the fray with passion and intensity. Recently, opposing groups of legal and 
economics professors submitted letters to Congress arguing about the state of 
the empirical evidence regarding patent law’s ability to encourage invention 
and dissemination of new technology.24  
All of which demonstrates that now is the time when patent scholars can 
make significant and meaningful contributions to the discussion of patent law 
and policy. This is why I am particularly pleased that the Boston College Law 
Review is publishing the insightful articles contained in this issue. 
Oskar Liivak’s article, When Nominal Is Reasonable: Damages for the 
Unpracticed Patent, deals with the vexing problem of patent “trolls” and the 
appropriate remedies for noncommercialized patents. 25 Liivak argues that 
awarding substantial royalty damages to noncommercializing patent holders 
is both bad policy and contradictory to Supreme Court precedent. He asserts 
that courts have erroneously awarded patent infringement damages, and thus 
he proffers a correction: that patent holders that neither commercialize nor 
attempt to commercialize their patents should be entitled to no more than 
nominal damages when they sue for patent infringement.  
Importantly, Liivak’s proposal is nuanced and allows both acts in prepa-
ration of commercialization, and unsuccessful efforts to commercialize, to be 
awarded substantial patent royalty damages. Although I worry somewhat 
about the proposal’s effect on upstream inventors, and about whether true 
patent trolls would figure out ways to game Liivak’s categorization, his pro-
posal is an important one that could lead to substantial changes to the way 
that courts award patent damages. Unlike many reform proposals that rely on 
legislative or executive action, Liivak needs only to convince judges of his 
interpretation of the law. Moreover, Liivak’s article is particularly timely be-
cause courts are engaged in an ongoing debate about how to award damages 
in patent cases. Thus, this article may find an unusually receptive audience in 
the courts. 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015); Support Technology and Research for Our 
Nation’s Growth Patents Act, S. 632, 114th Cong (2015). 
 23 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: White House Task 
Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, WHITE HOUSE (June 4, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues, archived at 
https://perma.cc/G4KX-2N58. 
 24 See Letter from Clark D. Assay et al., to Members of U.S. Congress (Mar. 25, 2015), archived 
at https://perma.cc/UUM3-PFPX?type=pdf; Letter from Michael Ambramowicz et al., to Members 
of U.S. Congress (Mar. 10, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/9ZA3-9K3P?type=pdf. 
 25 Liivak, supra note 12, at 1034. 
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Dmitry Karshtedt’s article Upstream Patents takes on another important 
problem in patent law: incentivizing early stage invention that does not yet 
have a definite application for end users.26 In so doing, Karshtedt persuasive-
ly explains that certain Supreme Court decisions regarding patentable subject 
matter, utility, and written description all seek the same end: the disallowance 
of patents on early stage inventions that have no known application for end 
users. The Court disallows such patents because it worries that they will be 
used to block beneficial downstream innovation and thereby arrest important 
developments. 
Karshtedt argues that these “upstream patents,” disallowed by the Court, 
all suffer from the same problem: lack of completeness. He then analyzes the 
arguments on both sides of the issue of upstream patenting of “incomplete” 
innovations and observes the inconsistency of legal decisions addressing this 
problem in different areas of innovation. For instance, a microscope is grant-
ed patent protection, while genetic material useful in identifying certain ge-
netic sequences is not, even though both innovations are used to make down-
stream discoveries, and both are of little use to consumers on their own.  
He concludes that disrupting downstream innovation is a reasonable 
concern, but that it is also socially beneficial to encourage upstream innova-
tion. He thus proposes that Congress create a new patent right dubbed the 
“research patent,” which would have both a limited term and constraints on 
the potential damages awarded for infringement. In sum, Karshtedt’s proposal 
encourages upstream innovation while attempting not to overly burden down-
stream applications of that innovation. Given the importance of discoveries of 
research tools in chemical and genetic fields, among others, Karshtedt’s pro-
posal has much to recommend it to legislative consideration. 
As explained, the AIA did not specifically address how its reforms were 
to be implemented. Professor Greg Dolin’s article, Dubious Patent Reform, 
partly fills this gap by analyzing the implementation of one of the most im-
portant changes wrought by the AIA: the Post Grant Review (PGR) proce-
dures.27 Although the AIA created many opportunities for relevant, analytical 
scholarship, the PGR—the new procedures by which anyone can challenge 
the validity of a patent after it issues—is one area in which analysis is particu-
larly needed. One of the essential benefits of Dolin’s article is that he does not 
just examine and explain the new PGR procedures, but also historically situ-
ates them in the broader effort to improve patent quality. Doing so allows 
Dolin to demonstrate that PGR suffers from many of the same flaws that have 
plagued earlier attempts to improve patent quality, such as the prior patent 
reexamination process.  
                                                                                                                           
 26 Dmity Karshtedt, Upstream Patents, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2015). 
 27 Greg Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881 (2015). 
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In his analysis, Dolin argues that the costs of PGR are too expensive and 
fail to achieve a sufficient degree of certainty with respect to patent validity. 
In other words, Dolin asserts that PGR is, on balance, unwise and should 
therefore be subjected to further reform efforts. He provides a very useful 
service to academics, practitioners, and legislators alike by contrasting PGR 
with historical models of reexamining and assuring patent quality. Signifi-
cantly, he also uses empirical data on the old patent re-examination system to 
assess and critique the probability of PGR’s relative functionality. Given Dol-
in’s comprehensive historical analysis, in addition to his sustained critique of 
the new PGR, his article will be of benefit to authors and legislators in as-
sessing the new PGR procedures and whether they should be maintained or 
adjusted. 
The final patent piece in this issue is Brian Love’s essay, Inter Partes 
Review as a Shield for Technology Purchasers: A Response to Gaia Bern-
stein’s The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation. Love’s essay responds 
to Professor Bernstein’s earlier Boston College Law Review article, The Rise 
of the End-User in Patent Litigation.28 In her article, Bernstein cataloged how 
patent holders (mainly trolls) have adopted the strategy of suing numerous 
end users of technology in order to exploit their lack of sophistication and 
resources and thereby obtain a multitude of small settlements.29  
Love agrees with Bernstein’s assessment that patent lawsuits against end 
users are often abusive and detract from overall social welfare. Professor 
Love disagrees, however, with Professor Bernstein’s assertion that the proce-
dures to challenge patent validity created by the AIA are of little use to end 
users. Specifically, Love suggests that the new Inter Partes Review (“IPR”) 
procedures instituted by the AIA may provide important tools for end users 
and small technology purchasers to combat abusive patent assertion. He also 
suggests that manufacturers can use IPR to effectively protect purchasers of 
their products by obtaining stays of patent litigation or having patents outright 
invalidated.  
This is possible because, although previously disallowed, IPR allows 
anyone to file a procedure to challenge the validity of a patent. Love demon-
strates his points with the results of a new empirical study he conducted to 
test whether IPR provides defenses for end users and small technology pur-
chasing entities. The results of Love’s study are encouraging: end users and 
small entities have been quite successful both in having patent litigation 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Brian Love, Inter Partes Review as a Shield for Technology Purchasers: A Response to 
Gaia Bernstein’s The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1075 (2015). 
 29 See Bernstein, supra, note 20, at 1469–70. 
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stayed pending IPR and in having patent claims subject to IPR invalidated.30 
Love notes that notwithstanding these results, end users and small technolo-
gy-purchasing entities seem to be underrepresented in the percentage of IPRs 
filed relative to the percentage of patent litigations in which they are defend-
ants. He notes that IPR’s expense is the most likely culprit and concludes both 
with further suggested reforms and an endorsement of the reforms suggested 
in Bernstein’s article, on the basis that IPR does not completely protect end 
users from abusive patent assertion. 
I wish the reader of this issue of the BCLR very profitable reading. I 
congratulate and thank the Boston College Law Review for publishing schol-
arship that makes important contributions to the critical discussions surround-
ing patent law and policy 
.
                                                                                                                           
 30 Love’s article also supports Dolin’s contention that PGR, on the other hand, is not likely to 
be particularly effective. Love reports that through March 2014, almost 1000 IPR petitions were 
filed, while only 4 PGR petitions were filed. Love, supra note 28, at 1079–80. 
   
 
